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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether this Court should overrule the dormant
Commerce Clause holding of Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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1
INTEREST OF THE AMICI
Amici are professors of tax law and economics at
universities across the United States. As scholars
and teachers, they have considered the economic
consequences of this Court’s decision in Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), and have
concluded that Quill’s dormant Commerce Clause
holding should be overruled. Amici join this brief
solely on their own behalf and not as representatives
of their universities. A full list of amici appears in
Appendix A.1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
While the Supreme Court is rightly reluctant to
overrule
its
own
precedents
under
any
circumstances, the force of stare decisis is less
powerful in some contexts than in others.
Specifically, stare decisis exerts a weaker pull when
judicial doctrine in the relevant area is based not on
statutory interpretation but on changing competitive
circumstances
and
evolving
economic
understandings. Antitrust law is a paradigmatic
example of an area in which these conditions are
met, but the argument for a flexible application of

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.2, petitioner and
respondents have granted blanket consent to amicus briefs.
None of the parties or their counsel authored any part of this
brief in whole or in part or made any monetary contribution to
fund the preparation or submission of the brief, and no person
or entity other than amici and their counsel made such a
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this
brief.
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precedent is similarly strong with respect to dormant
Commerce Clause tax cases such as this one.
In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, the Court
emphasized that its dormant Commerce Clause
analysis was based on “structural concerns about the
effect of state regulation on the national economy.”
504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992). The Court was especially
concerned about the effect of taxation on the mailorder industry, and it believed that maintaining the
physical presence rule would “foster[] investment by
businesses and individuals.” Id. at 315-18. It also
believed that its rule would reduce compliance costs
for businesses and individuals engaged in commerce
across state lines. See id. at 313 n.6. For those
reasons, the Court reaffirmed the physical presence
rule first announced in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753
(1967).
The Court’s decision in Quill was predicated on
the competitive circumstances and economic
understandings of its time. And in the quarter
century since Quill, those circumstances and
understandings have evolved. While the Quill Court
was focused on the mail-order industry, it could not
and did not foresee the meteoric rise of online retail,
which has magnified the revenue losses that result
from the physical presence rule. In the age of online
retail, the physical presence rule has become a drag
on economic efficiency and a potential impediment to
investment across state lines. Meanwhile, the
development of tax automation software over the
past quarter century has led to a dramatic reduction
in sales tax compliance costs for multistate
retailers—so much so that overruling Quill would
likely reduce aggregate compliance costs for
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individuals and firms seeking to abide by state tax
laws.
Thus, to overrule Quill now based on changed
competitive circumstances and evolving economic
understandings would be to take it on its “own
terms.” See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct.
2401, 2413 (2015). It would be to acknowledge that,
regardless of whether Quill was rightly decided at
the time, the factual assumptions upon which it was
based do not apply to the Internet age. The Court
should reverse the judgment below, eliminate the
anachronistic physical presence rule for state sales
tax collection, and update its dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence to reflect a new technological
and economic environment.
ARGUMENT
I.

STARE DECISIS APPLIES WITH “LESSTHAN-USUAL FORCE” TO THE PHYSICAL
PRESENCE RULE
It is “never a small matter” for the Supreme
Court to overrule its own precedent. See Kimble, 135
S. Ct. at 2409. But it is a smaller matter in some
areas of law than in others. For example, the Court
“has viewed stare decisis as having less-than-usual
force in cases involving the Sherman Act.” Id. at
2412. The same reasons that justify a less rigid
approach to precedent in the antitrust context apply
equally to dormant Commerce Clause tax cases such
as this one.
The Court in Kimble identified a number of
factors that determine the strength of stare decisis,
and each of these factors favors a flexible application
of precedent here. First, “stare decisis carries
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enhanced force when a decision . . . interprets a
statute”—and correspondingly weaker force when a
decision does not. Id. at 2409. Dormant Commerce
Clause rules are, of course, nonstatutory. And while
Congress could in theory modify any rule rooted in
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, that fact
alone has not stopped this Court from revising its
dormant Commerce Clause precedents in the past.
See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 343 (1989)
(overruling Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966)); Dep’t of Revenue of
Wash. v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S.
734, 749-50 (1978) (overruling Joseph v. Carter &
Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947) and
Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm’n,
302 U.S. 90 (1937)); Complete Auto Transit v. Brady,
430 U.S. 274, 289 (1977) (overruling Spector Motor
Serv. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)). Indeed, one
objective of the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause
case law is “to eliminate the demand and necessity
for sweeping national legislation.” See Dep’t of
Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 365 (2008)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Second, stare decisis is stronger where Congress
intervenes with frequency—and thus where
Congress’s decision not to supersede a judicial
decision might be interpreted as acquiescence. See
Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409-10. In the area of state
sales and use tax collection, congressional
intervention is rare, and Congress cannot be said to
have acquiesced to the Court’s dormant Commerce

5
Clause holding in Quill.2 To the contrary, the Senate
voted 69-27 in May 2013 to pass the Marketplace
Fairness Act, which would have overturned Quill’s
holding and allowed states to impose sales tax
collection obligations on retailers with annual gross
receipts in total remote sales exceeding $1 million
nationwide. See S. 743, 113th Cong. (as passed by
Senate, May 6, 2013). The Marketplace Fairness Act
also enjoyed strong bipartisan support in the House
of Representatives, but that chamber’s leadership
refused to bring the bill to a floor vote. See Emma
Dumain, Last-Ditch Push to Pass Marketplace
Fairness Act in House Falls Short, Roll Call (Dec. 3,
2014), https://perma.cc/5WM3-YY6Q. The failure of
the Marketplace Fairness Act suggests—at most—
that a handful of members of one house of Congress
are reluctant to jettison the physical presence rule; it
does not indicate broad congressional support for the
status quo.
Third, stare decisis is more powerful with respect
to precedents that generate significant reliance
interests. See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2410
(“[C]onsiderations favoring stare decisis are at their
acme” in “cases involving property and contract
rights” because “parties are especially likely to rely
on such precedents when ordering their affairs.”
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted)).
But
The last significant congressional act addressing nexus
requirements for state tax collection came nearly six decades
ago, with the Interstate Income Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272,
73 Stat. 555 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381–391). That legislation
concerned income tax collection rather than the sales and use
tax collection issues implicated by Quill.

2

6
importantly, the Court has said that only a
“legitimate reliance interest” will warrant judicial
accommodation. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 824 (1982) (noting that “the doctrine of stare
decisis does not preclude” overruling precedent when
“it is clear that no legitimate reliance interest can be
frustrated by our decision” (emphasis added)). While
other dormant Commerce Clause precedents may
engender legitimate reliance interests, the physical
presence rule has not. As long as consumers comply
with state tax law, there is no tax advantage in
purchasing goods from out-of-state vendors because
consumers must pay use taxes when vendors fail to
collect sales taxes.3 Thus, insofar as consumers and
vendors have come to rely on the tax evasion
opportunities that the physical presence rule avails,
that reliance interest is illegitimate because it is
based on noncompliance with valid use tax laws.
Respondents have suggested that overruling Quill
would upset the reliance interests of retailers who
could be subject to “retroactive liability in dozens, if
not hundreds, or even thousands of jurisdictions.” See
Resp’ts’ Brief in Opp’n 35. That concern has no basis.
South Dakota has not sought to collect sales taxes

Taxes collected and remitted by out-of-state vendors are
sometimes denominated as “sales taxes” and sometimes as “use
taxes.” Compare State v. Wayfair Inc., 2017 S.D. 56, ¶5 (2017)
(decision below) (describing tax that South Dakota requires outof-state vendors to remit as “sales tax”), with Quill, 504 U.S. at
301 (describing tax that North Dakota sought to require out-ofstate vendors to remit as “use tax”). The brief refers to taxes
collected and remitted by vendors as “sales taxes” to distinguish
them from “use taxes” remitted by consumers.

3
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from any retailer for past transactions,4 and thus
this Court can—if it chooses—grant South Dakota all
the relief that the state requests while making its
ruling in this case purely prospective. See, e.g.,
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1701
(2017) (applying new rule in a civil case on a purely
prospective basis); Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation,
509 U.S. 86, 110–111 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that
“it is sometimes appropriate in the civil context to
give only prospective application to a judicial
decision” when the decision “overrule[s] clear past
precedent”). Moreover, no state or municipality has
suggested that it will seek to collect sales taxes on
past transactions from remote retailers, and dormant
Commerce Clause precedents that go unchallenged
in this case would likely prevent any jurisdiction
from doing so.5 Respondents’ fear of retroactive
See S.B. 106, § 5 (“No obligation to remit the sales tax required
by this Act may be applied retroactively.”); id. § 6 (providing
that retailers who lack a physical presence in South Dakota will
not be liable for sales tax on transactions that occur while this
litigation is pending).

4

One obstacle that would potentially prevent a state from
collecting sales taxes retroactively from a remote retailer is the
fact that all states with sales taxes also maintain use taxes
which they have imposed on (though not always collected from)
consumers who purchased goods from out-of-state sellers. Org.
for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., OECD Economic Surveys:
United States 96 (2005). Remote retailers could—and
presumably would—argue that the imposition of two taxes on
interstate transactions subjects interstate commerce “‘to the
risk of a double tax burden to which intrastate commerce is not
exposed, and which the commerce clause forbids.’” See
Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787,
1822 (2015) (quoting J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S.
5
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liability is grossly overstated—and, in any event, the
concern is one that this Court can squelch by making
its holding prospective only.
Fourth and finally, stare decisis is at its weakest
when the relevant area of law is explicitly based on
changing competitive circumstances and evolving
economic understandings. As the Court in Kimble
explained, stare decisis operates with diminished
force in the context of the Sherman Antitrust Act
because
Congress . . . intended that law’s reference to
“restraint of trade” to have changing content,
and authorized courts to oversee the term’s
dynamic potential. We have therefore felt
relatively free to revise our legal analysis as
economic understanding evolves and . . . to
reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived
a
practice’s
competitive
consequences.
Moreover, because the question in those cases
307, 311 (1938)). Relieving this burden by allowing remote
retailers to claim an exemption in cases where the consumer
has already paid use tax would—as a practical matter—be
impossible, as consumers who pay use taxes often do not report
the name of the retailer from whom goods were purchased. See,
e.g., S.D. Dep’t of Rev., Use Tax Form, https://perma.cc/U9RRVHZV (June 2016). And even if retroactive enforcement against
remote retailers is not invalidated as discriminatory against
interstate commerce, a state’s attempt to collect sales taxes on
transactions several years in the past might well place burdens
on those retailers which would be deemed “excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits,” and thus the effort could fail on
those grounds. See Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970); Adam Thimmesch, Undue Burdens and the Retroactivity
Issue in Wayfair, The Surly Subgroup (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://perma.cc/A6GV-CDTG.
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was whether the challenged activity restrained
trade, the Court’s rulings necessarily turned
on
its
understanding
of
economics.
Accordingly, to overturn the decisions in light
of sounder economic reasoning was to take
them on their own terms.
Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2412-13 (alterations, citations,
and internal quotation marks omitted).
The central question in dormant Commerce
Clause tax cases is not far from the question in the
Sherman Act context: whether a challenged tax “is,
in effect, a regulation in restraint of commerce
among the States.” Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S.
446, 455 (1886). The Court often relies on economic
analysis to answer that question. See, e.g.,
Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S.
Ct. 1787, 1803-04 (2015); W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy,
512 U.S. 186, 195 n.10 (1994). Quill itself is an
example. There, the Court explained that “the
Commerce Clause and its nexus requirement are
informed . . . by structural concerns about the effects
of state regulation on the national economy.” Quill,
504 U.S. at 312. In particular, the Court suggested
that the physical presence requirement had
supported the growth of the mail-order retail
industry, and that maintaining the rule would
“foster[] investment by businesses and individuals.”
See id. at 316. The Court was especially concerned
about the cost to small vendors of complying with
sales tax obligations imposed by each of “the Nation’s
6,000–plus taxing jurisdictions.” See id. at 313 n.6.
Its decision to reaffirm the physical presence
requirement rested on its understanding of the rule’s
economic effects. Thus, to overturn Quill “in light of
sounder economic reasoning” would be to take the

10
decision “on [its] own terms.” Cf. Kimble, 135 S. Ct.
at 2413.6
II.

THE COURT SHOULD OVERRULE QUILL
IN LIGHT OF CHANGED COMPETITIVE
CONDITIONS AND EVOLVING ECONOMIC
UNDERSTANDINGS
While Quill was largely based on “structural
concerns” about the effect of state taxation on the
“national economy,” those same concerns now cut
against the physical presence rule. Four negative
effects of the physical presence requirement merit
emphasis. First, the physical presence rule poses a
much more serious threat to the fiscal stability of
state and local governments than the Quill Court
could have anticipated. Second, the rule results in
economically inefficient consumption choices to an
extent that the Quill Court could not have foreseen.
Third, the physical presence rule distorts firms’
Overruling Quill’s dormant Commerce Clause holding would
still leave in place the limits on state taxing power imposed by
this Court’s Complete Auto test and by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Complete Auto, 430 U.S.
at 279 (holding that a state tax will survive dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny only if it (1) “is applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State,” (2) “is fairly
apportioned,” (3) “does not discriminate against interstate
commerce,” and (4) “is fairly related to the services provided by
the State”); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873,
877 (2011) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (recognizing that “[a]s a
general rule,” the Due Process Clause prohibits a state from
exercising jurisdiction over an individual or entity unless that
party “‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State’” (quoting Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958))).

6
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decisions about production, distribution, and
corporate structure in ways that perversely
discourage businesses from expanding across state
lines. Fourth and finally, the physical presence rule
likely raises the aggregate cost to consumers and
businesses of complying with state sales and use tax
laws.
A.

Revenue Losses Resulting from the
Physical
Presence
Rule
Have
Skyrocketed Since Quill

The revenue losses to state and local governments
as a result of the physical presence rule far exceed
anything that the Quill Court could have imagined—
most notably because the Quill Court could not and
did not foresee the rise of Internet retail. The Court
in Quill was confronted with revenue-loss estimates
of up to $3.27 billion per year across all 50 states.7
Nearly 30 years later, the best available estimate
pegs the revenue loss to state and local governments
as a result of the physical presence requirement at
$33.9 billion in 2018, rising to $51.9 billion by 2022.8
Br. of Amici Curiae Nat’l Gov’rs Ass’n et al. in Supp. of Resp.
24 n.13, 1991 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 666 (reporting $3.27
billion estimate for 1992 (citing Advisory Comm’n on
Intergovernmental Relations, State Taxation of Interstate MailOrder Sales: Revised Revenue Estimates, 1990-1992, at 2
(1991))); see also Br. of Amici Curiae Ariz. Mail Order Co. et al.
in Supp. of Pet’r 34 & n.40, Quill v. North Dakota, No. 91-194,
1991 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 537 (filed Nov. 21, 1991) (“Recent
estimates of revenue loss range from $694 million to $3 billion
per year.”).

7

8 Marketplace Fairness Coalition, $221 Billion in Lost Revenue
Over the Next 5 Years, https://perma.cc/5YDL-WAZW (last
visited Oct. 30, 2017).
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Accounting for inflation, the revenue impact of Quill
has jumped roughly six-fold since the time that Quill
was argued and decided, with further increases yet to
come.9
States effectively have two ways to make up for
that revenue loss.10 One is to cut spending on public
goods and services. The other is to raise taxes on
income, property, and sales made by retailers who
maintain a physical presence within the state. Yet
higher taxes on a narrower base generally reduce
economic growth more than lower taxes on a broader
base. For this reason, excluding online and other
remote transactions from the sales tax base likely
decreases the overall efficiency of state tax systems.
See William F. Fox, Retail Sales and Use Taxation, in
The Oxford Handbook of State and Local
Government Finance 406, 415-16, 422-23 (Robert D.
Ebel & John E. Petersen eds., 2012).
The fiscal cost of the physical presence
requirement is especially significant given that Quill
itself rested on the premise that interstate commerce
generally “may be required to pay its fair share of
state taxes.” Quill, 504 U.S. at 301 n.5. Online
retailers unquestionably benefit from state and local
government investment in transportation and
broadband infrastructure. Allowing these vendors to
See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator,
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited
Feb. 25, 2018).
9

Forty-six states are subject to constitutional or statutory
balanced budget requirements of varying force. See Nat’l Ass’n
of State Budget Officers, Budget Processes in the States 52 tbl.9
(2015).
10
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avoid state and local sales taxes is at odds with the
“fair share” principles underlying the Court’s
dormant Commerce Clause tax cases. See Or. Waste
Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 102
(1994) (“It was not the purpose of the commerce
clause to relieve those engaged in interstate
commerce from their just share of state tax burdens.”
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted));
Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 281 (“[T]he Court
consistently has indicated that interstate commerce
may be made to pay its way . . . .” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Thus, what at the time of Quill looked like a
relatively narrow exemption for a mail-order
industry of modest size has grown to be a gaping hole
in state and local sales and use tax bases. As Justice
Kennedy has noted, “Quill now harms States to a
degree far greater than could have been anticipated
earlier.” Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct.
1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). These
revenue consequences are one—though not the
only—reason that the Court should jettison the
physical presence rule.
B.

The Physical Presence Rule Leads to
Economically Inefficient Consumption
Choices

In the age of online retail, the physical presence
rule reduces economic efficiency in ways that were
not apparent at the time of Quill. When that case
was decided, there was little evidence to suggest that
consumers were changing their purchasing decisions
in order to circumvent state and local sales taxes. See
Michael L. Klassen, Karen Glynn & Kathleen Porter,
Sales Tax Effects on Mail Order Consumer
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Purchasing Decisions, 8 J. Direct Marketing 21, 22
(1994) (noting “a paucity of research on the subject of
state sales tax effects on consumer behavior in mail
order purchasing decisions”). Thus, there was little
reason to believe that the differential taxation of instate and out-of-state retailers distorted consumer
decisionmaking to an economically significant
degree.
Now, however, peer-reviewed economic research
has demonstrated that a significant share of online
shoppers alter their purchasing patterns so that they
can evade state and local sales and use taxes. See,
e.g., Austan Goolsbee, In a World Without Borders:
The Impact of Taxes on Internet Commerce, 115 Q. J.
Econ. 561, 568 (2000) (estimating that as many as 24
percent of online shoppers would purchase offline if
not for the opportunity to circumvent state and local
sales taxes); James Alm & Mikhail I. Melnik, Sales
Taxes and the Decision to Purchase Online, 33 Pub.
Fin. Rev. 184, 186 (2005) (putting that figure at 6
percent); Liran Einav et al., Sales Taxes and Internet
Commerce, 104 Am. Econ. Rev. 1, 3 (2014)
(estimating that “on average, the application of a 10
percent sales tax reduces purchases by 15 percent
among buyers who clicked on an item” on eBay). If
online retailers had collected sales taxes on those
transactions, a large number of consumers would
have switched to brick-and-mortar stores instead.
Moreover, consumers are much more likely to alter
their online purchasing patterns than to change their
mail-order purchasing decisions in response to sales
tax collection. See Eric T. Anderson et al., How Sales
Taxes Affect Customer and Firm Behavior: The Role
of Search on the Internet, 47 J. Marketing Research
229, 239 (2010) (finding that after a retailer begins
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collecting state sales taxes, “Internet orders decrease
by 11.6%” but “there is no apparent effect on catalog
orders”). In other words, the physical presence rule
appears to distort the decisions of online shoppers
much more than it distorted the decisions of mailorder customers—a phenomenon that can be
attributed to the fact that comparison-shopping is
much easier online than via catalog. See id. at 236.
The distortion of consumer purchasing patterns
resulting from the physical presence rule has
negative consequences for economic efficiency. See
Austan Goolsbee, The Implications of Electronic
Commerce for Fiscal Policy (and Vice Versa), 15 J.
Econ. Perspectives 13, 19 (2001). The Congressional
Budget Office offers the following example to
illustrate the negative economic consequences that
result from consumers altering their purchasing
patterns in order to circumvent state and local sales
taxes:
For example, a consumer might choose to
purchase books over the Internet for $100
inclusive of the shipping cost, pay no sales tax,
and fail to comply with the use tax rather than
purchase the same books at a local bookstore
for $102 inclusive of a local $5 sales tax. The
real resource cost of the books . . . purchased
from the Internet seller is $100 . . . . The real
resource cost of the same books . . . available
for sale from the local bookseller is $97 . . . .
Thus, the tax differential that results from the
consumer’s noncompliance with the use tax
causes this consumer to make a choice that
increases the production costs of books by $3.
That money represents a loss of economic wellbeing to society because those $3 worth of
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resources could have been used to produce $3
worth of other goods or services.
Cong. Budget Office, Economic Issues in Taxing
Internet and Mail-Order Sales, at 8 (Oct. 2003).
In sum, the physical presence rule leads
consumers to make purchasing decisions that
increase overall production costs—and those extra
costs are, from society’s perspective, pure waste. The
result is that a doctrine motivated by “structural
concerns about the effects of state regulation on the
national economy” instead undermines economic
well-being. Cf. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312. The Quill
Court could not have perceived the full economicefficiency costs of the physical presence rule because
it could not have foreseen that the rule would distort
the behavior of online shoppers so much more than it
affected the purchasing patterns of catalog
customers. Cf. Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2413 (Court
“relatively free” to reverse precedent “that
misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences”).
Stare decisis does not prevent the Court from
correcting that error.
C.

The
Physical
Presence
Rule
Discourages Vendors from Expanding
Across State Lines

Beyond the distortion of consumers’ purchasing
decisions, the physical presence rule leads vendors to
make inefficient decisions regarding production,
distribution, and corporate structure. More
specifically, the physical presence rule discourages
vendors from expanding their operations into new
states when doing so would trigger sales tax
collection obligations in additional jurisdictions. See
Anderson et al., supra, at 238-39 (analyzing store
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expansion decisions of 14 retailers over 3 years and
finding strong evidence that physical presence rule
causes retailers to avoid opening stores in new states
with sales taxes). This not only has negative effects
on economic well-being but also undermines the
dormant Commerce Clause’s objective of promoting
interstate economic activity.
The early years of Amazon.com provide a
particularly vivid illustration of the “extreme
measures” some companies take to avoid collecting
state sales taxes. See Stu Woo, Amazon Battles States
Over Sales Taxes, Wall St. J. (Aug. 3, 2011). The
company reportedly distributed color-coded maps and
spreadsheets to employees highlighting states that
employees should avoid on business travel for fear
that a physical presence—even if temporary—might
trigger sales tax collection obligations. The company
stopped recruiting at business schools in some states,
and employees reportedly refrained from sending
work-related e-mails if they ended up in a state
where the company did not collect sales taxes. See
id.11
Retailers have taken a number of further steps to
avoid sales tax collection obligations in additional
jurisdictions. In some cases, they have shut down
warehouses for fear that a physical presence in a
state might trigger sales tax liability. See, e.g., Jay
Greene, Amid Rapid Expansion, Amazon to Shutter
Kansas Warehouse, Seattle Times (Oct. 1, 2014). In
Amazon now collects sales taxes in all states that have one,
but it does not require third-party sellers on its site to collect
state sales taxes. See Linda Qiu, Does Amazon Pay Taxes?
Contrary to Trump Tweet, Yes, N.Y. Times (Aug. 16, 2017).
11
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other cases, companies have split off their Internet
businesses so that ownership of brick-and-mortar
stores would not force the firm to collect sales taxes
online. See Erik Brynjolfsson & Michael D. Smith,
Frictionless Commerce? A Comparison of Internet
and Conventional Retailers, 46 Mgmt. Sci. 563, 570
(2000). In many of these instances, firms are
adopting inefficient distribution strategies and
corporate structures solely for tax avoidance
purposes. The resources that they devote to these
efforts rather than to more productive ends
constitute a deadweight loss to the national economy.
Worse yet, by discouraging firms from expanding
across state lines, the physical presence rule
undermines the dormant Commerce Clause’s goal of
promoting “economic union.” See Dennis v. Higgins,
498 U.S. 439, 453 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
When the physical presence rule causes a company to
split off its operations in another state or to shutter
its operations across state lines, it contributes to the
very “economic Balkanization” that dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine strives to avoid. See
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 577 (1997). This marks one
more way in which the Quill Court misperceived—or
failed to foresee—the economic consequences of its
holding, and one more reason why the Court should
depart from that holding today.
D.

The Physical Presence Rule Likely
Raises
the
Aggregate
Cost
of
Complying with State Sales and Use
Tax Laws

Finally, the physical presence rule—which the
Quill Court thought would reduce the cost of
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complying with state tax laws—likely has the exact
opposite effect. The Quill Court expressed concern
about the “administrative and record-keeping
requirements [that] could entangle a mail-order
house” if it were subject to sales tax obligations in
every jurisdiction. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6
(alterations omitted). But what the Quill Court failed
to appreciate is that the physical presence rule does
not make those administrative and recordkeeping
burdens go away. It merely shifts those burdens from
vendors to consumers, who are then left to comply
with use tax obligations on their own.
In the years since Quill, vendors have gained
access to sophisticated tax automation software that
dramatically reduces the cost of complying with sales
tax obligations in multiple jurisdictions. See Joe
Crosby & Diane Yetter, No Excuses: Automation
Advances Make Sales Tax Collection Easier for
Everyone, 85 State Tax Notes 571, 575, 580 (Aug. 7,
2017) (concluding that in light of technological
advances that post-date Quill, “even if a sales tax
applied to every individual sale in every
jurisdiction . . . , robust sales tax compliance would
still be reasonably possible for all businesses at
prices commensurate with their other regulatory
obligations”); PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Retail
Sales Tax Compliance Costs: A National Estimate—
Volume One: Main Report 18 (2006) (finding in
survey of retailers nationwide that “having more
nexus states did not necessarily result in higher sales
tax compliance costs”). For $20 per month or less,
small businesses can automate their sales tax
preparation for every state. See Avalara, Avalara
TrustFile: Pricing, https://perma.cc/S65G-2WRP (last
visited
Oct.
30,
2017);
TaxJar,
Pricing,
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https://perma.cc/VR3V-J9N4 (last visited Oct. 30,
2017). Amazon also offers to calculate and remit
sales taxes for sellers on its Marketplace platform for
a small fee. Amazon.com, Selling at Amazon.com:
Tax
Calculation
Service
Terms,
https://perma.cc/A654-H9NR (last visited Oct. 30,
2017).12
There has been no comparable technological
transformation that has slashed compliance costs for
consumers seeking to comply with their use tax
obligations. Consumers still must track all of their
purchases over the course of the year, determine
when the vendor has collected sales tax and when it
has not, and then calculate the use tax due on each
item.
Even
the
most
fastidious
personal
recordkeepers will face difficult challenges in
interpreting and applying state and local use tax
laws that impose different rates on different
products.
It is safe to assume, then, that the cost of
complying with state sales and use tax obligations
will be lower if the compliance burden is borne by
vendors instead of consumers. Vendors generally
enjoy scale economies and access to technologies that
most consumers cannot match. To be sure, many
consumers will incur no compliance costs because
they will simply disregard their jurisdiction’s use tax
laws. See Nina Manzi, Use Tax Collection on Income
In addition, a majority of states now allow vendors to retain a
small percentage of the sales taxes they collect in order to
partially offset compliance costs. See Fed’n of Tax Adm’rs, State
Sales Tax Rates and Vendor Discounts (Jan. 2017),
https://perma.cc/K4TH-A3JQ.
12
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Tax Returns 10 (Minn. House of Representatives,
Research Dep’t, Policy Brief, Apr. 2015) (noting that
fewer than 2 percent of taxpayers reported use tax on
state income tax returns in 2012). But insofar as the
Court’s concern is to make it easier for individuals
and firms to comply with the law, that concern
weighs against the physical presence rule’s retention.
By overruling Quill, the Court would reallocate the
compliance burden from consumers who are illequipped to handle it to the vendors that are
generally in a much better position to calculate and
pay state sales taxes.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
court below should be reversed.
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